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Plaintiff Rosetta Stone Ltd. ("Rosetta· Stone'1 respectfully submits this opposition to
Google [nc.'s ("Go ogle") Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Opinion of Dr. Kent Van Liere.
For the reasons that follow, Google's motion should be denied.

INTRODUcrION
On July 10, 2009, Rosetta Stone filed a complaint against Google to stop Google's
unauthorized use and sale of Rosetta Stone's trademarks as keywords that trigger ihird-party,
paid advertisements on Google search-results webpages. Prior to filing the instant suit, Rosetta
Stone commissioned a study by Dr. Kent Van Liere to detennine whether Google's practices
cause a likelihood of consumer confusion. Conducted in April and May 2009, Dr. Van Liere's
survey reveals that Google's practices of allowing advertisers to bid on Rosetta Stone's
trademarks and use the marks within the ad text .o f advertisements displayed on Google's searchresults pages results in a net consumer confusion rate of 17%. Google now moves to strike Dr.
Van Liere's expert report and testimony on the grounds that the survey results are irrelevant and
the sUlVey methodology is flawed. For the reasons sel forth below, Dr. Van Liere's survey is
relevant, sotllld, reliable, and consistent with accepted principles of survey design. As such, the
Court should deny Google's motion to exclude.
BACKGROUND
A.

Confusion Associated With Google's AdWords Program

Through its AdWords program, Google permits companies to buy advertising on
Google's search-results pages that is triggered when web users enter certain keywords into
Google's search engine. Advertisers bid money to purchase the keywords that trigger the ads,
which are labeled as "Sponsored Links," and the bidders most attractive to Google receive the
most desirable and visible positions along the top and right-hand side of the search-results page.
The advertisers then pay Google each time a web user clicks on one of its Sponsored Links.
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Google initially prohibited advertisers from using the trademarks of other companies as
keyword triggers. [n 2004, however, Goog!e changed its policy and started selling trademarks of
others as keywords in the United States and Canada. In considering its 2004 policy change,
Google conducted several in-house experiments to determine the level of consumer confusion
associated with ads using trademark terms in the ad text.

(Ex. 32.) I

These experiments

concluded that the use of trademark terms in either the ad body or the ad title resulted in a high
likelihood of consumer confusion:
•

Preliminary results "indicate[dJ that confusion remains high when TM's are
allowed in the body but not in the ad title. For a user, it seems to make little
difference whether slhe sees a TM in the ad title or ad body - the likelihood of
confusion remains high. This inference is' also supported by qualitative/anecdotal
data, i.e., responses by our subjects to open-ended questions asked at the end of
the experiment. This suggests that the only effective TM policy for US/Canada is:
(I) Allow TM usage for keywords (2) Do not allow TM usage in ad lext - title or
body." (Ex. 33.)

•

"87.5% of users were confused at least once during Experiment 2, and 76% of the
users were confused at least once during Experiment 4." (Ex. 34.)

•

"Overall very higb. rate of trademark confusion (30-40% on average per user) .. .
94% of users were confused at least once during tbe study." (Ex. 35.)

Inasmuch as Googlo's own studies concluded that the use of trademarks in ad text was highly
likely to cause consumer confusion, Google maintained its prohibition against using trademarks
in ad text when it revised its trademark policy in 2004. (Ex. 59, Hagan Dep. at 92:16-23 &
93:18-94:5; Ex. 60, Hagan Dep. at 90:12-91:5; Ex. 51, Chen Dep. at 209:4-10.) In explaining
the decision, Google's senior trademark counsel Rose Hagan testified that "if trademark terms
are used in the ad text by parties who are not the trademark owner, there seems to be more user-

Unless otherwise noted, exhibit references herein are to the exhibits attached to the
Declaration of Jennifer L. Spaziano in Opposition to Google's Motion for Summary
Judgment and Its Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Opinion of Dr. Kent Van Liere.
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potential user confusion about whether or not that advertiser is somehow affiliated with the
trademark owner or offers those products." (Ex. 58, Hagan Dep. at 93:18-94:5.)
Following the 2004 policy change, Google defended its new policy by emphasizing that it
did not allow advertisers to use trademarks in ad text:

•

In 2004, Ms. Hagan stated: "The standard in the U.S. for trademark infringement
is likelihood of confusion, and we just don't believe users are likely to be
confused unless there is something in the ad te"i that is causing that confusion."
(Ex. 48.)

•

In 2008, Richard Holden, director of product management for AdWord.o; told The
Wall Street Journal: "We have a long-running policy where we don't allow
advertisers to use trademarked term~ in ad text to avoid creating any user
confusion." (Ex. 61.)

Even Goagle's co-founder and co-president Larry Page testified in January 2007 that the
inclusion of other companies' trademarks in Sponsored Link ads would likely cause consumer
confusion.

The transcript of Mr. Page's deposition in Google Inc. v. American Blind &

Wallpaper Factory. [nc., 03-cv-05340-1F (N.D . Cal.), provides the following exchange:
Q.

Does the current Google trademark policy permit me to use my
competitors' trademarks in the ad text?

A

['m not familiar with the details of our policy currently.

Q.

So you don't know?

A

r think it probably -

Q.

Why not?

A

[assume there's a variety of reasons for (hat

Q.

Do you know of any?

A.

I mean, it might cause confusion.

you are saying use your competitor's ad '- trademark
in your ad text [think it probably does not allow you to do that

.•.

(Ex. 66, Page Dep. a182: 17-83:5.)

3
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"

"

Effective June 15, 2009, Google again amended its policy on the use of trademarks in
AdWords advertisements in the United States. Notwithstanding Google's previous confusion
studies, the repeated statements of its high-ranking employees about the probability of consumer
confusion, and the lack of any new study or survey concluding otherwise, Google decided to
allow advertisers to use other companies' trademarks in the text of their advertisements - even
over the obj ection of the trademark owner.
B.

Dr. Vall Liere's Credential.

Shortly after Google's 2009 trademark policy change, Rosetta Stone filed the instant
action. Before doing so, however, Rosetta Stone retained Dr. Kent Van Liere, a Vice President

at NERA Economic Consulting, to conduct a consumer survey designed to assess whether
Google's trademark practices resulted in consumer confusion. Dr. Van Liere is an expert in
market analysis) sampling analysis, and survey research relating to, among other topics.

consumer decision making, consumer choice, and co.nsumer behavior. (Ex. 38, Expert Report of
Kent D. Van Liere ("Van Liere Report") at 1.) Dr. Van Liere earned a Ph.D. in Sociology (with
specialization in research methods and statistics) (rom Washington State University and was a
·tenured Associate Professor at the University of Tennessee, where he taught graduate and
undergraduate courses in statistics, survey research methods, and social psychology. (Jd at Ex.
A.) In addition to teaching as a Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Wisconsin, Dr.

Van Liere served as a Principal, President, or Director of market anal ysis and survey research for
HBRS and Hagler Bailly for more than 15 years. Dr. Van Liere also served as President and
CEO of the market intelligence finn Primen. (Jd)
Over his 30-year career, Dr. Van Liere has conducted hundreds of studies and published
numerous articles in technical reports and peer-reviewed journals concerning consumer attitudes,

4
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choices, and behavior. (Id at 1.) He has substantial experience conducting and using focus
groups and surveys to measure consumer opinions and behaviors regarding products and services
including purchase processes, branding and positioning, market segmentation, product attributes,
new product research, and communications strategies. (Id) During his career, he has facilitated
hundreds of focus groups and has designed and analyzed hundreds of surveys focusing on
marketing-related issues. (Id.)
Dr. Van Liere has testified at trial and in deposition on the application of statistical
methods, sampling, questionnaire design, and the use of surveys. (Jd at Ex. A.) In the area of
trademark infringement, his expertise extends to conducting surveys measuring likelihood of
consumer confusion, secondary meaning, and dilution. (Jd)
c.

Dr. Van Liefe's Confusion Study

In this ca,e, Dr. Van Liere designed a survey to determine whether consumers are
confused as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the Sponsored Links that appear on the
Google search-results page after a conswner has conducted a search using a Rosetta Stone mark
as a keyword and/or are confused as to the affiliation, endorsement, or association of the
websites linked to those Sponsored Links with Rosetta Stone. (Id at 2.) Dr. Van Liere designed
his research in conformance with gen.erally accepted principles for the design of trademark
confusion studies as described in several key treatises on the subject. (Id at 4.) His Expert
Repott derails his methodology with respect to key areas of confusion studies, including the
definition of the relevant population, the procedures for sampling from the relevant population,
the survey questions and interviewing procedures, the nature of the specific lest and control
stimuli shown to sampled consumers, and the protocol for estimating confusion. (See id at 4-11 .)

5
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In designing the study, Dr. Van Liere defined the relevant population as "United States
consumers who would potentially use Google's search services to gather information about the
purchase of products and services from Rosetta Stone or to purchase products and services from
Rosetta Stone." (Id. at 4.) Dr. Van Liere then used qualified interviewers to conduct face-toface, double-blind surveys in shopping malls in eight separate cities representing the major
census geographic regions of the United States'> (Id at 5.) Individual consumers at these malls
were sampled in accordance with demographic quotas to assure a reasonable representation of
the diversity of consumers in the relevant population. (ld. at 5-6.) Respondents then were asked
screening questions to ensure that they were part of the relevant population. Based on these
screening questions, a respondent was considered qualified for the interview if he or she:

1. was interested in lenrning a foreign language;
2. would use the internet in the next 12 months to look for infonnation about
learning a foreign language;

3. had heard of Rosetta Stone as a company that offers foreign-language products;
and
4. had used Google as an internet search engine in the past 12 months and would use
Google as an internet search engine in the next twelve months.

(Id. at 6.)

A total of 379 respondents met the screening criteria, aRd these respondents were
randomly assigned to one of two conditions:

188 were sbown and asked about the "test

stimulus," and 191 were shown and asked about the "control stimulus." (Id. at 7.) The test
stimulus was an actual screenshot of a Google search-results page triggered by the keyword

2

Chicago, !L; Dallas, TX; Denver, CO; Gaithersburg, MD; Miami, FL; San Jose, CA; Seattle,
WA; and Yorktown Heights, NY.

6
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"Rosetta Stone.'" (Id. at Ex. D at 1.) The test stimulus included not only organic search results
down the left-hand side of the page, but also Sponsored Links along the top and right-hand side
of the page. (Jd) Each Sponsored Link contained some variant oftbe Rosetta Stone mark. (Jd)
The control stimulus was identical to the test stimulus except the control did not include the
allegedly infringing Sponsored Links - the subject of the consumer confusion study. (Id. at Ex.
Oat 2.) In other words, the organic search results were identical on the test and control stimuli.
After the screening process, respondents were administered the main survey in front of a
laptop computer screen. (Id at 7.) Respondents were asked to click the Internet Explorer icon,
which opened to the Google home search page. (Id at 7-8 .) Respondents were instructed to
enter "Rosella Stone" into the Google search box and hit the enter button. (Id at 8.) Either the
test or control stimulus then was displayed on the respondent's computer. (Id at 7-8.) While the

respondents reviewed the search results, the interviewers asked a series of questions:
•

"Which link or links if any do you think seUs Rosetta Stone language software

products?"
•

C<Of the links you mentioned, which link or links, if any, rue a Rosetta Stone
company website?"

•

"Of the links you mentioned, which link or links, if any, are endorsed by the
Rosetta Stom:: company?n

(Id at 8.) During the questioning, no distinction was made, and no guidance was given, with
respect to organic links and Sponsored Links. (Id) Following these questions, respondents were
asked to explain why they believed each of the links they identified was either a Rosetta Stone
company website or a link eodorsed by Rosetta Stone. (Id at 9.)

,

As explained in Section ILD.I infra, the only cbange to the screenshot was the removal of
the Rosetta Stone Sponsored Link to obtain an accurate measure of the confusion caused by
Google's conduct.

7
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Under Dr. Van Liere's protocol for estimating the levels of confusion in the test condition,
respondents were counted as confused if they identified any Sponsored Link as being a Rosetta
Stone company website or endorsed by Rosetta Stone. (ld. at 11.) Under the protocol for
estimating confusion in the control condition, respondents were counted as confused if they (i)
identified any organic link other than the official Rosetta Stone website as being a Rosetta Stone
company website, or (ii) identified any organic link other than the official .Rosetta Stone website
or the Wikipedia website' as being endorsed by Rosetta Stone. (ld)
Based on the survey results, Dr. Van Liere concluded that a significant portion of
U

consumers in the relevant population are likely to be confused as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of the 'sponsored links' that appear on the search results page after a consumer has
conducted a Google search using a Rosetta Stone trademark as a keyword andlor are likely to be
confused as to the affiliation, endorsement, or association of the websites linked to those
'sponsored links' with Rosetta Stone." (ld at 2-3.) More specifically, Dr. Van Liere's study
concluded that 47% of the 188 test·condition respondents were confused and 30% of the 19 1
control-condition respondents were confused, yielding a net confusion rate of 17%. (ld at 12.)
ARGUMENT
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702;
. which provides, in relevant part:
If scientific, technieal, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto .. . if (I) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methcds, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
4

As explained infra, Rosetta Stone endorses the Wikipedia website relating to Rosetta Stone
software, inasmuch as Rosetta Stone monitors and contributes to the website.

8
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When a party seeks to admit any expert testimony, the district court's obligation is to selVe a
"gatekeeping" function. Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 261 (4th
Cir. 2005) (citing Kumbo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. \37, 141 (1999)). In carrying out its
"galekeeping" role, a court not only should view such evidence with an understanding of the.
difficulty in devising and executing a sUlVey, but also should consider any technical defects in
the sUlVey design as a factor in giving evidentiary weight to the expert testimony rather than
rejecting the results out of hand. 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
32: 178 (4th ed. 2009)(citing Squirteo. v. Seven- Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980)).
In general, "courts are loathe to exclude consumer

sUIV~ys

from evidence." McNeil-PPC,

Inc. v. Merisanl Co., No. 04-1090 (JAG), 2004 WL 3316380, at *12 (D. Puerto Rico July 29,
2004). Indeed, it is rare that a survey, no matter what flaws are alleged, is "completely unhelpful
to

L~e

trier of fact." See AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., I F.3d 611, 618 (7th

Cir. 1993) (labeling the district court's rejection of survey evidence as "premature," and noting
that "any shortcomings in the survey results go to the proper weight of the survey and should be
evaluated by the trier of fact"); see also Children '5 Med. Ctr. of Dallas v. Columbia Hasp. at

Med City Dallas Subsidiary LP., No. 3-04-CV-2436-BD, 2006 WL 616000, at *7 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 10, 2006) (admitting sUlVey even with alleged bias in its initial screening question, a
universe defined too narrowly, and a

"100

limited" geographic area). So long as the survey is

conducted according to accepted principles, "survey evidence should ordinarily be found
sufficiently reliable under Dauberr." Southland Sad Farms v. Slover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134,
1143 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation § 11.493,
al '103 (4th ed. 2004) ("Even if the court finds deficiencies in the proponent's showing, lhe court
may receive the evidence subject to argument going to its weight and probative value.").

9
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I.

CONFUSION AS TO AFFILIATION, ENDORSEMENT, OR ASSOCIATION IS
ACTIONABLE UNDER 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
Google preliminarily argues that Dr. Van Liere's survey and expert opinion are irrelevant

because they "'shedD no light on the question that is key to' Rosetta Stone's trademark
infringement claim-confusion as to source or origin of goods." {Google Mem. in Supp. of Mot. .
to Exclude ("Google Mem.") at 6.) Google contends thal because the Court dismissed Rosetta
Stone's claim for false representation under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(0), "the question that remains in
this case-and the question that would be relevant to a survey' or opinion testimony-is whether
users are confused as to source or origin of the goods advertised." (Jd at 7.) According to
Google, because the survey shows confusion only as to whether Rosetta Stone has "endorsed"
the advertisers whose Sponsored Links appear on the test stimulus, and " Rosetta Stone's
operative pleading no longer contains a claim based on 'endorsement,' Dr. Van Liere's survey
and any opinion testimony about it lack any probative value and should be excluded." (Jd)
Google's misguided argument is premised entirely on the faulty contention that confusion
as to affiliation, endorsement, or association is actionable only under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(0). To
the contrary, however, such confusion is also actionable under 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1), which is the
statutory basis for Rosetta Stone's claims under Counts I, II, and III ofits Amended Complaint.
As an initial matter, a comparison of the plain text of the two provisions reveals thai the
confusion actionable under § 1114(1) is as broad, if not broader, than the confusion actionable
under § 1125(a). Section 1114(1) prohibits, inter alia, the use in commerce of a registered
trademark if such use is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." In

contrast, § 1 I 25(a) prohibits, inter alia, the use of a "any word, term, name, symbol, or devise"
in connection with the sale of goods or services in a manner that would "cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with

10
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another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person." Thus, whereas the types of confusion actionable under

§ 1125(a) are specitically limited to "affiliation, connection, or association" and "origin,
sponsorship, or approval," the types of confusion actionable under § 1114(l) are not so limited.
The history of the Lanham Act further supports a broad interpretation of the confusion
actionable under § 1114(1). The original language of § 1114(1 l, as adopted in 1946, limited
confusion for trademark 'infringement purposes to "purchasers as to the source of origin of [the]
goods or services." In 1962, however, Congress amended the Lanham Act by striking the words
"purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods or services." See Pub. L. No. 87-772 § 17,
76 Stat. 769, 773 (Oct 9, 1962). Following this amendment, courts broadly interpreted the
confusion element as protecting against al l kinds of confusion, not just confusion as to source or
origin of the goods. See. e.g., Synlex Labs.• Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568569 (2d Cir. 1971) (concluding that the 1962 amendment prohibits "the use of trademarks which
are likely to cause confusion, mistake; or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor
simply as to source of origin").

Indeed, the Fourth Circuit also' concluded that the 1962

amendment broadened the protection that § 1114 affords so that the "public is protected from
being confused as to the sponsorship of goods or services purchased." AMP Inc. v. Fay, 540
E.2d 1181, 1184, 1184 n.5 (4th Crr. 1976) (emphasis added) ("'lbe deletion of the language, so
far as this case is concerned, may only broaden the protection afforded.").
Congress codified the courts' broad interpretation of the confusion standard when it again
amended the Lanham Act in 1989. This time, Congress amended § 1125(a), which originally did
not refer at all to confusion. to expressly protect against confusion "as to the affiliation,

connection: or association of sllch person with another person, or as to the origin. sponsorship, or
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approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person." Although
Congress did not amend § l114{l) in a similar fashion, courts and leading authorities have
continued to recognize that the confusion necessary for trademark infringement of federally
registered marks under § 1114(1) extends to any kind of confusion, not just that related to the
Source or origin of the goods. See, e.g., McCarthy, Trademarks and UnJair Competition § 23:76

(2009) (noting § 1114's broader scope following the 1962 Lanham Act amendment).
Notably,. even after the 1989 amendment to the Lanham Act, courls in the Fourth Circuit
continued to recognize that confusion as to affiliation, endorsement, approval, and source or
origin of goods is actionable under § 1114(1). See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings,

fIlC.,

962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992) (UIn other words, an unauthorized use of a trademark infringes
the trademark holder's rights if it is likely to confuse an 'ordinary consumer' as to the Source or
sponsorship oJthe goods.") (emphasis added) (citation omitted»; Maurag, fnc. v. Bertuglia, 494
F. Supp. 2d 395, 397 (E.D. Va. 2007) (explaining that to show likelihood of confusion under §
1114, a plaintiff could show ads are likely to cause-customers to patronize one restaurant
thinking it was affiliated with another).
At bottom, Google is plainly wrong that "endorsement confusion ... is not at issue in this
case." (Google Mem. at 8.) To the contrary, whether consumers believe that RoseJl!). Stone has
endorsed, is affiliated with, or has approved third-party Sponsored Links triggered by, and
containing, Rosetta Stone's marks is central to Rosetta Stone's trademark infringement claims.
Pertinent authorities make clear that endorsement, affiliation. or sponsorship confusion is
actionable under § 1114(1). Thus, notwithstanding the Court's dismissal of Rosetta Stone's false
representation claim under § 1125(a), the confusion measured in Dr. Van Liere's survey as to
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both origin and endorsement is actionable under Rosetta Stone's remaining federal trademark
infringement counts and therefore "legally relevant"

n.

DR VAN LIERE'S SURVEY IS RELIABLE AND SHOULD BE ADMITIED.
A.

Dr. Van Liere's Survey Is Consistent With The Ample Evidence Of Actual
.
Confusion Already Part OlThe Record In This Case

As detailed above, Google conducted several internal studies concluding that its current
trademark practices result in consumer confusion.

Senior Google officers and employees -

including Google's co-founder and co-president Larry Page - have testified that the use of
trademark terms in the text of Sponsored Links causes consumer confusion. In addition, in a
similar trademark infringement case that GEICO brought agitinst Google in this Court, Judge
Brinkerna found that the GEICO expert's survey results "were sufficient to establish a likelihood
of confusion regarding those Sponsored Links in which the trademark GEICO appears either in
the heading or text of the ad." GEICO v. Goog/e. Inc., No. I:04CY507,1005 WL 1903128, at
'7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8,2005). Moreover, Rosetta Stone deposed five college-educated consumers
who testified that they were confused by Google's Sponsored Links when they attenipted to
purchase Rosetta Stone software over the internet. (Ex. 52, Doyle Dep. at II :15-14:6; Ex. 53.
DuBow Dcp. at 15:2-19:20; Ex. 62, Jeffries Dep. at 13:5-14:17; Ex. 67, Porter Dep. at 12:2223:9; Ex.- 69, Thomas Dep . .at 12:16-18:3.) Aside from being relevant and reliable, Dr. Van
Liere's study is entirely consistent with the powerful evidence of actual confusion already
marshaled in this case. This ract alone undermines Google' s arguments that Dr. Van Liere's
report and testimony should be excluded.
B.

Google's Expert Has Provided No Independent Survey Or Data To Support
His Opinions, But Instead Merely Criticizes Dr. Van Liere's Survey

Google's confusion expert Dr. Edward A. Blitir has submitted a report and declaration
criticizing Dr. Van Liere's study, but Dr. Blair did not conduct his own study to test the actual
13
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confusion that arises as a result of Google's practices. Moreover, he offers no independent
empirical data to support his criticisms of Dr. Van Liere's study. This Court has been skeptical
of experts who merely criticize the opposing expert's study without conducting a survey of their
own. See, e.g., Teaching Co. Ltd. P'ship v. UnaPix Enlm 'I, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 567, 584 (E.D.

Va. 2000) (Lee, 1.) ("When questioned about Unapix's failure to conduct its own survey, Mr.
Ossip suggested that time and financial limitations did not permit it. However, Unapix had
ample opportunity to conduct a 'proper' survey on likelihood of confusion, since it completed a
survey purportedly addressing secondary meaning by the end of July.")
Other courts similarly havc been critical of experts who pass judgment without
conducting their own surveys. For example, in a trademark infringement case before the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California, the court concluded that the expert's
criticisms of plaintiff's confusion expert amounted to nothing more than "differences of opinion
between survey experts about the optimum survey design." E. & J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle
Co. , No. CV-F-86-183 REC, 1989 U.S. Dist Lexis 7950, at "27 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 1989). The

court explained:
While Defendants' expert, Dr. Robert Sorensen ("Sorenson"), criticized Field' s
survey design, his criticisms are based on untested hypotheses about how
consumers might have reacted to Field' s questions or to alternate questions
suggested by Sorensen. Sorensen did not conduct a survey of his own design to
demonstrate different levels of confusion or the invalidity of Field's design.
Absent such evidence, Sorensen's criticisms show nothing more than differences
of opinion between survey experts about the optimum survey design. Field's
questions were carefully framed to address the relevant issues of consumer
confusion and were tested for effectiveness. In light of Mervin Field's 41 years'
experience and preeminent reputation, Field.' s .survey . design is eminently
trustworthy.
[d.; see also BellSouth Corp. v. Tn/ernel Classified of Ohio, No. I :96-CV-076.9-CC, 1997 WL

33107251 , at '20 (N .D. Ga. Nov. 12, 1997) (''Defendants did !'ot conduct a survey of their own.
The failure to conduct a survey has sometimes been criticized.

Regardless, Defendants[,J
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'Monday-morning quarterbacking' of BelJSouth's survey is without merit. BeIlSouth's survey is
probative of a finding of likelihood of confusion."); CyloSport, Inc. v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 617 F.
Supp.2d 1051, 1076 n.IO (E.D. Cal. 2009) C'Notably, while defendant submits a declaration by

an expert who criticizes plaintiff's survey, defendant did not conduct its own survey, despite
adequate time to do so. At oral argument, remarkably, defendant's counsel achmt!ed that he and
his client made a conscious choice to not perfonn a competing survey. as they believed the
motion was baseless ·and a survey was thus, unnecessary."). This Court likewise should be
skeptical of Dr. Blair's "Monday-morning quarterbacking" and untested hypotheses in this case.
Google's and Dr. Blair's criticisms are further undermined by Dr. Blair's admission
during his deposition that the use of Rosetta Stone's name in the ad text of another company's
Sponsored Link would increase the likelihood of confusion. (Ex. 50, Blair Dep. at 117:12117:18.)

Morom'cr, it is telling that Dr. Blair - Google's own confusion expert - never

requested, received, or reviewed any confusion studies previously conducted by Google. (Id.,
Blair Dep. at 45:2 I -46: IS.) Given the dearth of empirical support for Dr. Blair's criticisms and
untested hypotheses, along with the strong evidence of actual confusion in this case, the Court
should give little weighl to the criticisms set forth in Google's Motion to Exclude.
C.

Alleged Flaws In The Survey Go To The Weigbt, Not The Admissibility, Of
The Expert Opinion
.

Google identifies what it believes to be flaws in Dr. Van Liere's survey design and
methodology.

These alleged technical deficiencies, however, bear only on the evidentiary

weight that a fact finder should give to the survey, not on the admissibility of Dr. Van Liere's

expert testimony. Courts generally hold that such alleged technical flaws can reduce a survey's
weight, but they will not prevent the survey from being admitted into evidence. See Selchow &
Richler Co. v. Decipher, Inc. , 598 F. Supp. 1489, 1503 (E.D. Va. 1984); see also Sehering Corp.
15
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v. Pfizer, Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 228 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that "errors in methodology

0 properly

go only to the weight of the evidence - subject, of course, to Rule 403 's more general prohibition
against evidence that is leSs probative than prejudicial or confusing"); Wend! v. Host Int'l, fnc.,
125 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Challenges to survey methodology go to the weight given .
the survey, not its admissibility."); AHP Subsidiary Holding Co., I F.3d at 618 (noting that "any
shortcomings in the survey results go to the proper weight of the survey and should be evaluated
by the trier of fact"); Brunswick Corp. v. Spini! Reel Co., 832 F.2d 5I3, 523 (lOth Crr. 1987)
(stating that a "survey is trustworthy if it is shown to have been conducted according to generally
accepted survey principles" and that allegations of technical and methodological deficiencies
"relate not to the survey's admissibility but to the weight to be given such evidence"); Whirlpool

Props., Inc. v. LG Elecs. US.A.,fnc., No. 1:03 CV 414, 2006 WL 62846, .1'"2 (W.D. Mich. Jan.
10, 2006) ("A survey need not be perfectly conducted for testimony concemin.g its results to be
admissible. So long as the expert's testimony and the underlying survey have probative value
after all the survey's deficiencies are taken into account; testimony concerning the results of the
survey that meets the basic requirements of usefulness and reliability is admissible into evidence,
and the trier of fact may accord it the weight it deems proper.") (citing 4 Weinstein § 702.06[3]
at 702-1 40); 5 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 32:170.
Indeed, in Selchow & Richter Co., this Court stated that "[ilt must be recognized that no
survey is perfect." 598 F . Supp. at 1502 (assessing plaintiff's survey under a Lanham Act claim).
There, the defendant attacked plaintiffs' survey on grounds that (1) the sample size was too small,
(2) the respondents were not properly selected, (3) the geographic area surveyed was too narrow,
(4) it failed to accurately recreate the purchasing environment, (5) the results were not properly
validated, and (6) the questions asked were leading and, therefore, biased. Id The Court stated
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that "the flaws exposed by the defendant should be taken into consideration in determining the
weight that the Court attributes to the survey." Id. The Court added th.t "(slurveys, where
results were far more inconclusive than plaintiffs' survey, have been relied upon as strong
evidence of likelihood of confusion." ld. The Court took into consideration the flaws' of the
survey in giving it evidentiary weight, but stiU relied upon it as evidence of the likelihood of
confusion between the contested products. ld. at 1503.
Consistent with this practice, in January of this year, this Court held that the issues of
reliability, survey controls, fitness, and materiality in the consumer survey before it went towards
the weight ajury may give it, not the survey's admissibility. PBM Prods. LLC v. Mead Johnston
Nutrition Co., No. 3:09-CV-269, Slip Copy, 2010 WL 56072, at *3-5 (ED. Va. Jan. 4,2010);
see also Tllnnell v. Ford Motor Co., 330 F. Supp."2d 731, 742 (W.D. Va. 2004) (concluding that

any criticism of witness's scientific method was a question of weight for the jury). So too, here,
Google's challenges to Dr. Van Liere's survey go to the weight a jury may give it, not its
admissibility.
D.

Dr. Van Liere's Methodology Is Sound, Reliable, And Consistent With
Accepted Principles Of Survey Design

Google has identified four categories of alleged methodological flaws in Dr. Van Liere's
study. Not unly are Google's criticisms unfounded, but even if true, none renders Dr. Van

Liere's conclusions unreliable or inadmissible.
1.

Dr. Va n Liere's Survey Replicates Actual Market Conditions

Google asserts that Dr. Van Lier.'s study did not replicate actual market conditions
because it "failed to adequately approxi mate nonnal online shopping behavior." (Google Mem.
at 10.) Specifically, Google criticizes the study because respondents were not able to click
Sponsored Links " to determine if an ad is relevant to their search and to find more information
17
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about the advertised product of service." (ld.) According to Google, "[d]epriving the consumer
of this important information 'distorts the experience' in a way that undermines the reliability of
the survey." (Id. (citing Simon Property Group LP. v. mySimon. Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033,
1044 (S.D. Ind. 2008».)
As .an initial matter, although courts generally require that consumer surveys accurately
reflect marketplace conditions, they do not require surveys to precisely replicate the process by
which consumers actually purchase products or come in contact with a mark. See Visa Int 'I Servo

Ass'n

V.

JSL Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319 (D. Nev. 2008) ("Moreover, Defendant has

provided no authority for the proposition that a scientifically valid survey must replicnte the
process by which a person will come into contact with the relevant mark. In contrast, Plaintiff
presented evidence that accepted scientific methods require only that consumers are shown the
mark.").'
Having said that, Dr. Van Liere's survey did accurately replicate the relevant search
behavior of an online consumer searching for Rosetta Stone on the internet using Google's
search engine.

As detailed in Dr. Van Liere's Expert Report, the interviewers asked the

respondents to enter the relevant search term into the search box and hit enter. (Ex. 38, Van
Liere Report at 7-8.) Tne computer then displayed the relevant search results.
Nothing in the survey suggested

,

~at

(Id. at 8.)

the searcb-results page was not live. In fact, considerable

Google's reliance on Simon Property; Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores. Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302
(N.D. Ga. 2008); and THOJP v. Walt Disney Co., _
F. Supp. 2d _ , 2010 WL 447049
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010) is misguided, for the cases are inapposite. Unlike the studies in
those cases, Dr. Van Liere's survey included the necessary "contextual cues" typically
present on a Google search-results page, including the organic search results, the ads, the
associated text, images, and the rank order in which the listings appear. In addition, unlike in
THO/P, this survey replicated an authentic Googlc. scarch-experience common to Google

users.
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effort was undertaken by Dr. Van Liere and his

staff to replicate an actual Google searcb, as

opposed to simply presenting the respondents with a printout of a Google search-results page.
As to the substance of Google's criticism that the search-results pages did not bave
"clickable links," Dr. Van Liere's survey was properly designed to test "initial interest"
confusion caused by Google's Sponsored Links. Courts have widely accepted initial interest
confusion as a type of actionable confusion under the Lanham Acl

Sae, e.g., Brookfield

Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). As Judge
Brinkerna explained in GEICO v. Google, Inc., initial interest confusion
describes the distraction or diversion of a potential customer from the Web site he
was initially seeking·to another site, based on the user's belief thaI the second site
is associated with the one he originally sought Inherent in this concept is the risk
that the user will be satisfied with the second site or sufficiently distracted tbat he
will not arrive at or return to the site for whicn ne was originally searching.
No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at '4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (internal citations omitted).
Even if a web user cures her confusion by clicking on a Sponsored Link and realizing she has not
arrived at the Rosetta Stone site as intended, the damage already has been done. Thus, any
"contextual clues" provided to respondents by clicking the Sponsored Links would be irrelevant
to Dr. Van Liere's measure of initial interest confusion. The ·lack of "clickable links" on the test
and control stimuli, therefore, is entirely immaterial to Dr. Van Liere' s survey and opinions.
Google also criticizes Dr. Van Liere for removing the official Rosetta Stone Sponsored
Link from the test stimulus. Google asserts that the removal of the Rosella Stone Sponsored
Link "likely influenced the survey results." Google's criticism is unavailing for two reasons.
First, Dr. Van Liere's removal of the Rosetta Stone Sponsored Link was warranted
because Rosetta Stone is forced to bid on its own trademark in an effort to secure the top listing
in Google's Sponsored Links and thereby minimize the number of web users diverted to
competitors, counterfeiters, and resellers as a result of Google's alleged infringing condu~t. (Ex.
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63, Leigh Dep. at 43:4-43:11 ("Unfortunately, because Google has been accepting money from
companies to bid on our trademarks and use our trademark within ad text, I am forced to bid to
position one (i.e., the top position] within Google search so that customers that are looking for us
have a better chance of finding the authentic Rosetta Stone site instead of a pirate site where .
they're going to end up getting duped.").) Consequently, the test search-results page appears
exactly how it would if Rosetta Stone were not forced to bid on its own mark. 6
Although Google cited the deposition testimony of Rosetta Stone General Manager and
Vice President Eric Duehring in support of its contention that the official Rosetta Stone
Sponsored Link should not have been removed from the test stimulus, Mr. Duehring's testimony
actually supports Dr. Van Liere's decision to do so. When asked why Rosetta Stone wanted to
appear at the top of the Sponsored Links, Mr. Duehring explained:
So because Google strives so hard to present organic links in a way that the most
relevant results appear at the top of the list, many consumers arc confused about
whether or not a sponsored link is organic or not And so appearing in line with
those organic results is valuable because people make the mistake of clicking on a
sponsored link when they think they might be getting an actual official website or
an objective listing.
And so, unfortunately, the confusion created requires us to be in a position to
make sure that when folks might be confused we're in a position that they click
on us properly.
For instance, if you (search] au Rosetta Stone, the first organic result might be
rose!tastone.com, and if there are three links above it for a pinate site and I don't
bid to be in that position, and I run the risk of somebody mistaking that one of
those sites is the official site, well, that's deceptive to the consumer and
destructive to all the work j've done to get somebody to do a search on my brand.

6

It would tum trademark law on its head to test likelihood of confusion without controlling for
efforts by the trademark owners to mitigate the harm caused by the alleged infringer.
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(Ex. 54, Duehring Dep. at 111:25-112:22.)7
Second, Google's and Dr. Blair's assertion tbat removal of the official Rosetta Stone
Sponsored Link "likely influenced the survey results" is entirely speculative. His report includes
no survey data or empirical evidence to support his belief. Indeed, during his deposition, Dr.
Blair conceded that he "cannot tell exactly what the effect might be." (Id, Blair Dep. at lSI: 1I-

151 :20.) In fue absence of any credible or empirical support for Dr. Blair's belief, the Court
should not credit Dr. Blair'S speculation.
2.

Dr. Van Lier.'s Control Stimulus Was Appropriate

Google argues that Dr. Van Liere's survey failed "to lise an adequate control stimulus to
filter out the background noise in the survey." (Google Mem. at 12.) Specifically, Google
complains that "tar fewer organic links refer "to the plaintiff Rosetta Stone in the control
condition than in the test condition-two versus seven." (Id .at 13.)
In support of its argument, Google notes that a proper control in a confusion study should
"share as many characteristics with the experimental stimulus as possible, with the key exception
of the characteristic whose influence is being assessed." (Id at 12.) Google's reliance on this
quotation is remarkable because Dr. Van Liere designed his control in strict accordance with tl,is
instruction. The control stimulus is identical to the test stimulus except that the control does not

include the Sponsored Links ccwhose influence is being assessed:"
GODgle takes issue with the control stimulus not because it fails to share as many
characteristics with the test stimulus as possible (except for, of course, the characteristics whose
influence is being evaluated). but because it does not fai l to do. so. Specifically, Google does not
7

Google also attempts to use the deposition testimony of Nino Ninoy to support its argument.
Google admits, however, that Mr. Ninov never had an opportunity to review Dr. Van Liere's
methodology. Therefore, he bas no basis for critiquing a survey he has not reviewed.
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like the fact that the assortment of organic links on the control stimulus - which, again, is
identical to the assortment of organic links on the test stimulus - does not include sufficient
Rosetta Stone commercial-related links to increase the confusion rate on the control condition,
which thereby would reduce the overall net confusion rate.
Accordingly, Google's rea] complaint is not with the manner in which Dr. Van Liere
created the coutrol stimulus, but with the selection of the sereenshot on which both the test and
control stimuli are based. This is reflected in Google's criticism that Dr. Van Liere could have
selected a screenshot with "more balanced content" that Google assumes would have resulted in
a lower net confusion rate.

(Id at 14.)

Google, once again, makes an assertion without

providing any survey data or empirical evidence to support its position. Without testing these
screeoshol., Google's argument is pure conjecture. Google had sufficient time and resources to
conduct its own confusion study to test its hypotheses, but it chose not to do so. In light of this,
the Court should provide little weight to Google's speculation.
That aside, Google fails to appreciate that the identical sets of organic links in both the
test and control stimuli are actual Google organic search results generated by Google's algorithm.
According to Google, its algorithm identifies organic links to web pages that are most relevant to
the web user's search query.' (Google Answer 1) 4 [Dkt 22).) The composition of organic links
in the test and control stimuli, therefore, was determined by Google's algorithm, Dot by Dr. Van
Liere. Thus, even if it were true that "the design of the control stimulus prdctically dictated a

,

Interestingly, none uf the third-party advertisers with Sponsored Links on the Google searchresults page used in Dr. Van Liere's study had organic links appearing on the frrst page of
search results. Given that Google's algorithm lists the organic links in order of relevance to
the search query, it is reasonable to conclude that Google's algorithm did not view these
advertisers as particularly relevant to the "Rosetta Stone" search. Thus, the only way fur
these advertisers to elevate their ads to the highly sought-after first page of Google search
results was to bid on Rosetta Stone's mark and purchase a position in Google's paid search.
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high level of 'net confusion' based on the content of the links," (Google Mem. at 14), as Google
claims, it was Google's algorithm and Google's practice of selling Rosetta Stone's trademark to
third party advertisers that dictated the high level of net confusion, not Dr. Van Liere.
Furthermore, the suggestion that Dr. VanLiere could have selected other Google search- .
results pages with a list of organic search results that might have resulted in a higher confusion
measure for the control stimulus is irrelevant The reality is that the test stimulus is an actual
screenshot of a Google search-results page generated by the keyword "Rosetta Stone,'" the
control stimulus was an appropriate control inasmuch as it properly excluded the elements being

assessed for consumer confusion, and Dr. Van Liere's swvey is a reliable measure of the
consumer confusion caused by the Sponsored Links on this actual Google search-results page.
Next, Google argues that respondents who correctly answered the initial survey question
("Which link or links if any . .. sells Rosetta Stone language software products?'') should not be
coullted in the confusion calculation. (Id at 15.) Google explains that these respondents should
be excluded because they were not asked the subsequent survey questions regarding whether the
links were either Rosetta Stune company links or links endorsed by Rosetta Stone. (Id)
Google's recalculation of the confusion rates by excluding those who correctly answered
the initial survey question - and therefore demonstrated that they were not confused - is flawed.
Google maintains that these individuals should not have been counted "towards the not-confused
population" because "they were never given the opportunity to say they were confused." (Id.)
To the contrary, their correct answers to the initial survey question clearly demonstrated thnt they
were not confused; if the respondents correctly believed that the other links did not sell Rosetta

,

For (he rell$ons stated in Section II.D.I , the Rosetta Stone Sponsored Link was removed from
the test and control stimuli. Otherwise, the test stimulus was identical to the screeosho!.
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Stone software, it is reasonable to conclude that they would not have believed those same links
were owned or endorsed by Rosetta Stone. Further, Google provides no plausible reason why a
control-condition respondent who correctly answered that no organic links other than the Rosetta
Stone link sells Rosetta Stone software would incorrectly indicate, if asked the two subsequent
sun'ey questions, that one or more of the other organic links were either Rosetta Stone company
links or endorsed by Rosetta Stone. Absent such an e,,:planation, Google seeks to exclude a large
segment of the unconfused respondents based on pure supposition that they might have given

inconsistent answers on the subsequent "ownership" and "endorsemene' questions.
Google points out that under its suggested protocol .of excluding respondents who
correctly answered the initial survey question, there would be a 75% confusion rate in the test
condition and a 73% confusion rate in the control conditioIL (Id) These excessively high
confusion rates on both the test and control conditions are further evidence that Google's
proposed protocol is flawed. It is premised on the conclusion that approximately three-fourths of
web users are coILfused by Google's search-results pages, condemning Google's "complex
algorithm" that is touted as automatically providing relevant results.
Finally, another reason the Court should give little weight to Google' s argument relating
to the control is that some of Google's statements in support of its argument are simply incorrect.
For iostance, Google asserts: "Given the screenshot Dr. Van Liere selected and his methodology,
far fewer organic links refer to the plaintiff Rosetta Stone in the control condition than in the test
condition-two versus seven."

(Id at 13.)

Again, the set of organic links on the control

stimulus is identical to the set of organic links on the test stimulus. (See Ex. 38, Ex D.) Thus,
there cannot be - and, indeed, there is not - any discrepancy in the number of organic links
referring to Rosetta Stone Ltd. in the test versus the control conditions.
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In addition, Gaogle allegeS that the control stimulus "failed to include a representative
depiction of links actually referring to Rosetta Stone (the plaintiff) and links not referring to
Rosetta Stone (the plaintiff), such as third parties that use 'Rosetta' in their own marks or on
websites referring to the Rosetta Stone artifact." (Google Mem. at 13.) However, the control
stimulus actually includes "representative depiction[sj" of each of these categories "flinks:

1. links actually referring to Rosetta Stone (the plaintiff) - Rosetta Stone: Learn
English, Leam Spanish, Leam French, Learn . . . (www.rosettasone.com)
2. links not referring to Rosetta Stone !the plaintiff) - Ancient Egyptian Culture
(www.mnsu.edulemusuemlprehistory/egyptlhieroglyphics/rosettastone.htmJ)
3. third parties that use "Rosetta" in their own marks - Rosetta Stone for Unix
(bhami.comlrosettahtml)
4. third parties that use "Rosetta" on websites referring to the Rosetta Stone artifact

- The Rosetta Stone (www.rosettacomIRosettaStone.html)
(Ex. 38, Van Liere Report, Ex. D.)
3.

Dr. Van Liere's Survey Targeted And Surveyed The Appropriate
Univene Of Consumers

Google next complains that tbe survey has not captured the appropriate universe of
consumers because the respondents did not independently recall Rosetta Stone's brand during the
screening. (Google Mem. at 16.) Google claims that "respondents who could independently
recall the Rosetta Stone brand would generally be more familiar with the brand, which, in tum
could have had a material effect on the level of confusion measured by the survey." (Jd)
Dr. VanLiere appropriately identified the relevant population for the survey as "United
States consumers who would potentially use Google's search services to gather information
about the purchase of products and services from Rosetta Stone or to purchase products and
services from Rosetta Stone." (Ex. 38, Van Liere Report at 4.) To ensure that the survey sample
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reflected this relevant population, survey interviewers asked a series of screening questions.
Most relevant to Google's criticism is Question S5:
I am going to read a list of companies that have foreign language products. Please
tell me, which, if any of these companies you have heard of?

1
2
3

4
5

Berlitz
Pimsleur
Rosetta Stone
Fluenz
None of these

(Ex. 38, Van Liere Report, Ex. C.) Only those respondents identifying Rosetta Stone in response
to this screening question qualified to participate in the survey.
Despite Google's speCUlative criticism, screening question S5 adequately ensured that the
respondents were sufficiently familiar with Rosetta Stone. Though Google may wish to limit the
confusion survey to only those consumers most knowledgeable about Rosetta Stone in an effort
to skew the results in Google's favor, restricting the survey to only these consumers would be
inappropriate for a confusion study regarding the alleged infringement of Rosetta Stone's marks.
Aside from the soundness of the screening procedures, Google's assertion that the
manner in which Dr. Van Liere screened respondents on their familiarity with the Rosetta Stone
brand materially affected the survey results is pure conjecture. Neither Google nor its confusion
expert effers any empirical support for this hypothesis. Nor do they provide any authorities to
bolster their claim that the screening procedures on the respondents' familiarity with Rosetta
Stone were inadequate. On these bases alone, the Court should not credit Google's criticism.
Google's baseless nitpicking continues with its criticism that the surveys were conducted
only in shopping maIls that did not have a Rosetta Stone kiosk- (Google Mem. at 16.) Google
speculates lhat selecting malls with Rosetta Stone kiosks would have provided "a sample more
closely akin to the actual population interested in Rosetta Stone." (Id. at 17.)
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Dr. Van Liere's decision to exclude malls with Rosetta Stone kiosks was entirely
appropriate and consistent with fundamental survey design principles, as it was intended to
reduce potential bias. First, the survey was conducted as a double-blind survey, meaning that
neither the interviewers nor the respondents kilew who commissioned the study. If a respondent
had walked by a Rosetta Stone kiosk shortly before participating in the survey, he or she might
have assumed that the survey was sponsored by Rosetta Stone and thus· undermined the intent
behind double-blind surveys. Second, respondents who had just seen a Rosetta Stone kiosk
might have been more likely to select more links as being endorsed or 'owned by Rosetta Stone
because Rosetta Stone was fresh in their minds. To protect against either type of bias, Dr. Van
Liere sensibly excluded such malls from the survey.
Furthermore, Dr. Van Liere's common-:sense decision to exclude malls with Roset.ta

Stone kiosks did not mean that the surveys were not otherwise conducted in high-end malls that
cater to Rosetta Stone's target customer base. In fact, the malls were specifically selected to
ensure the population was representative of consumers who might be seeking iafonnation about
Rosetta Stone's products. It also should be noted thai simply being a shopper at one of the eight
malls was not sufficient, in and of itself, to qualif'y a consumer as a participant in the survey.
Rather, the respondent had to answer the screening questions to qualify. The selection of the
malls merely affected the incidence rate - i.e., the nll!Dber of people who had to be contacted to
find respondents qualified for the survey - not the qualifications of the survey population.
4.

Dr. Van Lier. Properly Calculated Endorsement Confusion

Google's final criticism of Dr. Van Liere's study is that he applied inconsistent
definitions to the term "endorsemenf' when calculating confusion with respect to the test and
control stimuli. (Google Mem. at 17-18.) Specifically, Google argues that if Dr. Van Liere
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concludes that Rosetta Stone "endorses" the Wikipedia site in the organic search results because
Rosetta Stone reviews and contributes content to the Wikipedia site about Rosetta Stone, then Dr.
Van Liere likewise should conclude that Rosetta Stone "endorses" Amazon.com and Cactus
. Coupon because of their "official relationships" with Rosetta Stone. I. (Id)
Dr. Van Liere's protocol for counting confusion with respect to the Wikipedia,
Amazon.com, and Coupon Cactus links was proper and consistent Respondents who stated that
Rosetta Stone "endorses" the Wikipedia link were not counted as confused because Rosetta
Stone does, in fa.;!, endorse the link. As Dr. Van Liere testified, Rosetta Stone monitors the
Wikipedia site and contributes content - including its trademarked terms - to the sites. (Ex. 70,
Van Liere Dep. at 84:18-85:15.)

Indeed, Rosetta Stone supports the Wikipedia site and

welcomes its position on the first page of the Google search results.
In contrast, Rosetta Stone does not "endorse" the Sponsored Links of Amazon.com or

Coupon Cactus. Although Amazon.com is an authorized reseller of Rosetta Slone software and
has the right to use Rosetta Stone's marks oil Amazon.com's webpages, Rosetta Stone has not
provided Amazon.com authority to bid on Rosetta Stone's mark through the Google AdWords
program or use Rosetta Stone's marks in the ad text of its Sponsored Links. (Id, Ramsey Dep. at
148:20-148:23; 164:9-164:13.) Similarly, Rosetta Stone has not authorized Coupon Cactus to
bid on or use Rosetta Stone's mark in its Sponsored Links since September 2008. (Id, Leigh
Dcp. at 166:19-166:24; 171:5-171:9; 176:12-176:14.) Thus, when the survey was conducted in
April and May 2009, Rosetta Stone did not "endorse" the Coupon Cactus Sponsored Link. [n
10

Similarly, Google criticizes Dr. Van Liere because he "failed to provide his respondents with
a definition of 'endorsement' when he asked them whether certain links were endorsed by
Rosetta Stone." (ld. at 17.) Google's position is disingenuous as its own counsel used the
term "endorsed," without definition, when deposing individuals who testified that they had
been confused by Google's Sponsored Links. (See, e.g., DuBow Dep. at 128:3-128:22.)
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light of this, Dr. Van Liere properly counted as confused any respondent who thought Rosetta
Stone "endorsed" the Amazon.com or Coupon Cactus Sponsored Link.
Even if Dr. Van Liere were to adopt Dr. Blair's inconsistent and factually erroneous
approach to counting as confused those control-condition respondents who stated that Rosetta .
Stone "endorses" the Wikipedia link, Dr. Blair's report indicates that the net confusion rate
would drop from 17% to II %. Given that courts have concluded that consumer surveys finding
a net confusion rate of 10% or more constitute viable evidence of a likelihood of confusion in
trademark infringement cases, see, e.g., Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth ·Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 467
n.15 (4th Cir. 1996); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400 (8th CiT. 1987), Dr.
Van Liere's report and opinion are probative and therefore should not be excluded.
On a related note, Google cites Mary Kay v. Weber in support of its position that the
Court should strike Dr. Van Liere's report and opinion. 601 F. Supp. 2d 839 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
The Mary Kay case, however, provides little useful guidance with respect to Ooogle's motion
because Dr. Van Liere's survey was not excluded in MGlY Kay. as Google is seeking to do here.
Rather, the court required adjustments to the data based on verbatim responses of certain
interviewees, but otherwise was prepared to allow the jury to rely on the survey. Id. at 849.
Second, the Court should not give weight to Google's arg_ument that based on the Mary

Kay decision, certain respondents who indicated that the Amazon.com andlor Coupon Cactus
Sponsored Links were "endorsed" by Rosetta Stone should not be counted as confused because
of their open-ended responses.

Ooogle contends that some of these individuals seemed to

suggest in their open-ended responses that they came to this belief because Amawn.com and
Coupon Cactus appeared to be reselling Rosetta Stone goods. It is important to note, however,
that the ruling in May Kay was quite narrow, stating that "interviewees who believed affiliation
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eristed solely because the website sells Mary Kay products are inadmissible." Id. (emphasis
added). The court's use of the teIID "solely" was not by mistake, as it used the word Or words
similar thereto repeatedly in the context of the open-ended responses. fd at 848-49.
Dr. Blair's declaration fails to confirm which, if any, respondents believed that Rosetta
Stone endorsed Amazon.com or Cactus Coupon solely because the companies were resellers of
Rosetta Stone's goods.

This is so because, as Dr. Blair stated during his deposition, a

respondent's verbatim response "may not be a complete expression of what the respondent has
considered or factors influencing respondent" (Ex. 50, Blair Dep. at 120: 14-120:21.) lndecd, it
stands to reaso.n that a confused respondent is unable to articulate all reasons for, or factors
contributing to, his confusion.

Nevertheless, Dr. Blair's and Dr. Van Liere's competing

interpretations of the data should be submitted to the jury for its consideration, as "[v]igorous
cross·examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof' will be sufficient to assist the jury in weighing the evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). Thus, wholesale exclusion of Dr. Van Liere's report and
opinion is not warranted based simply on Dr. Blair's competing interpretation of the survey data.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Rosetta Stone respectfully requests that this Court deny
Google's Motion to Exclude Expert Report and 0l'inion of Dr. Kent Van Liere.
Respectfully submitted,
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